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Article
This research captures something rather unique to the lit-
erature on restorative justice. What follows is a detailed 
case study of the implementation of a victim–offender 
mediation pilot program. The impetus for this project, as 
well as the sustained effort to achieve the desired outcome 
was provided by the Restorative Justice Coalition of West 
Michigan (RJCWM).
As a case study, this research offers an inside look into the 
process of moving restorative justice theory into practice. 
The authors describe the implementation process from the 
early stages of planning through implementation. Presented 
in a chronological fashion, the authors explore the many 
challenges faced throughout the process. Major obstacles 
include a lack of support from key stakeholders within the 
criminal justice system, misconceptions surrounding the phi-
losophy of restorative justice, securing program funding, and 
stability of leadership among the implementation team. 
Although the campaign to implement a pilot program in 
restorative justice was ultimately successful, the final prod-
uct was far removed from the original vision of RJCWM.
Restorative Justice
Restorative justice continues to slowly emerge as an alterna-
tive to the more familiar forms of retributive justice in the 
United States. While restorative justice has roots in antiquity 
(Braithwaite, 2002), and continues to serve as one of several 
competing philosophies of crime and justice in numerous 
countries throughout the world (Van Ness & Strong, 2002), it 
has been adopted in the United States in a limited and at best 
piecemeal fashion. This landscape is largely due to the real-
ity that restorative justice represents a major shift in both 
philosophy and practice within the United States.
Under the current, retribution-based, criminal justice sys-
tem, the main focus is on determining guilt and dispensing 
punishments. A criminal act is, by definition, a crime against 
the state (Lemley & Russell, 2002). Unlike the retributive 
model, restorative justice defines crimes by the harms cre-
ated. The focus of restorative justice is to repair the harm 
caused by crime, making victims whole, holding offenders 
accountable, and preventing the occurrence of similar harms 
in the future (Van Ness, 1996; Van Ness & Strong, 1997; 
Zehr, 1990).
A popular definition offered by Tony Marshall (1996) 
states that restorative justice is “a process whereby all the 
parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to 
resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the 
offence and its implications for the future” (p. 37). The pro-
cess begins with the realization that crime signifies injury. 
One goal, then, of restorative justice is to repair that injury, to 
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make the situation right. Victim(s) and offender(s), along 
with other interested parties take part in a process of healing 
the injury experienced by the victim (Roche, 2003). Victims 
and offenders are, ideally, participants. They are given a 
degree of ownership in deciding an appropriate response to 
the harm created by the offender’s actions. Restorative jus-
tice affords victims, offenders, and the community an oppor-
tunity to participate in creating justice, allowing them to 
insert their voice and regain a sense of control in their lives.
Mediation
The words “restorative justice” are used as an umbrella term 
to describe a variety of programs that view crime and the 
response to crime through a restorative lens (Zehr, 1990). 
Such programs include victim–offender mediation, family 
group conferencing, community reparative boards, sentenc-
ing circles, and sentencing panels.
The first victim–offender mediation program emerged in 
the 1970s (Van Ness & Strong, 2013). Mediation offered 
“victims and offenders the opportunity to meet one another 
with the assistance of a trained mediator to talk about the 
crime and come to an agreement on steps toward justice” 
(Van Ness & Strong, 2013, p. 83). Prior to the 1970s, crime 
victims were largely ignored by the criminal justice system. 
However, beginning in the 1970s, the victims’ rights move-
ment began to push for greater victim participation in the 
justice process (Daigle & Muftic, 2016). It is no coincidence 
that restorative practices such as mediation emerged during 
this period.
Mediation, in accordance with the principles of restor-
ative justice, seeks to maximize victim participation in the 
process of achieving justice. Through mediation, the parties 
most directly affected by the harm (victims, offenders, and 
the community) gather in search of healing, restoration, 
accountability, and prevention (Zehr & Mika, 1998). The 
mediation process is guided by a trained facilitator whose job 
it is to help the participants resolve the situation and to repair 
the harm experienced by the victim. The mediator is there to 
assist the parties in making their own decisions about how to 
repair the harm. He or she is not there to make these deci-
sions for the parties.
One tangible outcome of a victim–offender mediation is a 
written agreement between the parties about how the harm 
will be repaired. Victims play a central role in the creation of 
the agreement, and offenders participate as well (Daigle & 
Muftic, 2016). Thus, the participants themselves become the 
owners of the justice process and its outcomes.
This stands in stark contrast to the offender-centric and 
state-dominated criminal justice system that routinely disem-
powers both victims and offenders as the state defines what 
justice should be (Zehr, 2013). This system is the result of a 
major paradigm shift that moved justice out of the commu-
nity and into a state-run, rights-based model (Van Ness, 
1990). Restorative justice is part of a movement that hopes to 
shift some of the ownership in resolving these matters back 
to the primary stakeholders.
Overall, restorative justice represents a clear shift in phi-
losophy and practice. Restorative justice places victims at 
the center of the process rather than offenders. Instead of a 
focus on determining guilt and dispensing punishments to 
offenders, restorative justice seeks to repair the harm caused 
by crime and prevent similar harms in the future (Zehr, 
2013). These were the philosophical underpinnings that 
grounded the attempt to design and implement the pilot pro-
gram in restorative justice described herein.
The Beginning
Fast Track Accountability Program (FTAP) was a pilot pro-
gram implemented in 2010 within a Midwestern city of 
approximately 200,000 residents. The city is situated in a 
county with a population of approximately 600,000. 
According to the U.S. Census, the city is composed of 59% 
non-Hispanic Whites, 20% African American, 15% Hispanic/
Latino, and 2% Asian (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015b). The 
median household income (in 2014 dollars) was US$39,913, 
including some 26% living below the poverty line (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2015a). During 2010, there were slightly 
more than 4,000 misdemeanor warrants authorized by the 
county court (Forsyth & Becker, 2015).
In the case in question, the attempt to integrate restorative 
principles into a meaningful program came out of a group of 
community advocates that banded together to form a restor-
ative justice coalition. Ultimately the group settled on the 
name RJCWM. The organic grassroots beginnings of this 
group mirrored the philosophical ideal that restorative prac-
tices should emerge from the communities, themselves, 
rather than being imposed from high-powered leaders 
(Hopkins, 2004). At the same time, the role of strong leader-
ship in the formation and maturation of this coalition cannot 
be underestimated. Without the benefits afforded by the rela-
tionships fostered and developed by its early leaders, FTAP 
would never have reached the implementation stage.
Although the groundswell for a restorative justice pro-
gram ideally comes from the community itself, the reality of 
a bureaucracy instituted to uphold a retributive approach 
necessitates a pragmatic approach that requires the active 
assistance of high-powered leaders. In the case in question, 
that high-powered leader was a City Commissioner.
The early planners included a rather diverse group of peo-
ple. Among the early members of RJCWM, there was a core 
group of local-level politicians, neighborhood association 
leaders, college professors, religious leaders, criminal justice 
reformers, and interested citizens. Virtually all of them were 
brought to the table at the request of a City Commissioner 
who once remarked that he would talk to anyone who would 
listen and that he intentionally cast a wide net and hoped 
some people would “stick around” (D. LaGrand, personal 
communication, December 12, 2012).
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In retrospect, the early planners and designers echoed 
themes identified by O’Conner (1997), who suggested that a 
key to the success of restorative justice programs is leader-
ship that recognizes the unique environmental and social fac-
tors that must be accounted for to facilitate development. The 
Commissioner’s experiences in prosecution and private 
practice gave him insight into the environmental and social 
factors at work in the local justice system.
Program Design
The City Attorney’s office was identified as the gatekeeper to 
the program. This was a strategic decision on behalf of the 
leadership of RJCWM. Other “diversion” programs had their 
inception within the state of Michigan’s 61st District Court, 
most notably the Drug and Sobriety Court founded in 1999 by 
Judge Patrick Bowler. In a similar manner to FTAP, the 61st 
districts’ Drug Court emerged largely as the vision of one man. 
As 61st Court administrator Josef Soper observed, “[t]he fact 
of the matter is that programs such as drug courts are created 
because people in a position to implement them, do” (Soper, 
2006). The decision to begin FTAP from outside the Court was 
guided largely by the fact that the City Attorney shared the 
Commissioner’s vision, and the judges were less enthused.
The lack of enthusiasm on the judges’ part was a point of 
much discussion in early planning meetings. The issue was 
discussed at numerous board meetings of RJCWM. The gen-
eral consensus of the board was that this program would 
never be successful without the court’s support. There would 
be no cases to handle.
Discussion with officials at the 61st District Court indi-
cated that the primary concern from the judges was one of 
cost. Once a defendant is charged with a crime, an automatic 
timetable is set in motion with the court. To keep a case on 
track, the Court had no choice but to route individuals 
through both the current system and FTAP at the same time. 
In cases where the offender did not fulfill his or her agree-
ment/contract, traditional court processing was the fallback. 
When offenders did fulfill his or her contract, charges were 
dismissed, and the Court had no avenue to assess fees and 
costs that would normally offset the costs of all the pretrial 
work. Thus, from the Court’s perspective, FTAP represented 
a cost with no possibility of recoupment. (See section titled 
“Discussion” for further consideration of this issue.)
Given the less than enthusiastic response from the judges, 
and the apparent interest of the City Attorney, the City 
Attorney’s office became the obvious choice. Following a 
police report, the City Attorney’s office approves a misde-
meanor charge or warrant authorization. This initial step at 
the City Attorney’s office was also selected as an ideal point 
to screen out individuals who did not meet certain criteria for 
FTAP.
The City Attorney’s office stipulated that all eligible par-
ticipants would be adults who were arrested for misdemean-
ors where the maximum possible penalty did not exceed 1 
year in jail. The three categories specifically targeted were 
removing property not your own1 (commonly referred to as 
shoplifting), malicious destruction of property2 (MDOP), 
and meddling and tampering.3 Both removing property and 
MDOP are charged as misdemeanors, when the value of the 
property or the amount of the destruction or injury, respec-
tively, is less than US$200.00. Under the current system, per-
sons found guilty of these offenses are punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than 93 days and/or a fine of not 
more than US$500.00 or 3 times the value of the property, 
whichever is greater. The logic behind selecting these three 
particular crimes was that they constituted the low hanging 
fruit for the 61st District. On average, there were approxi-
mately 500 such cases each year in the 61st District Court.
There were a few additional stipulations put in place by 
the City Attorney’s office. Those eligible for the program 
included only those who pleaded not guilty at their arraign-
ment. Additional eligibility criteria set forth by the City 
Attorney included not being charged with an associated fel-
ony or violent misdemeanor. However, prior convictions of 
any kind would not prevent offenders from being eligible to 
participate.
FTAP allowed offenders to have their charges appear as 
“dismissed” on their permanent record if they conceded to 
entering into mediation, negotiating a contract with the vic-
tim, and fulfilling that contract. In other words, this program 
functioned as a diversion for eligible participants. Contracts 
for the program needed to meet basic criteria established by 
the City Attorney, including a sincere apology, full restitu-
tion, and at least 20 hr of community service.
Program designers, optimistically hoping for room to 
negotiate, raised several concerns. First, they expressed a 
desire to cast a wider net, but found little room for negotia-
tions with the City Attorney’s office. Second, program 
designers pushed back against the agreement requirements, 
explaining that the participants should have the freedom to 
create the stipulations put forth in the agreement, and noted 
that although an apology was ideal, a forced or insincere 
apology can actually lead to revictimization. Finally, pro-
gram designers pushed back against the not guilty require-
ment. RJCWM took this as an opportunity to inform/educate 
the practitioners about restorative principles, but again found 
little room for negotiations. In the end, the program design-
ers determined these were necessary concessions to keep 
the pilot program moving forward. (See section titled 
“Discussion” for further consideration of this issue.)
Eligible individuals (hereafter referred to as offenders) 
were to be contacted first and the program’s nature and 
requirements would be explained. Offenders were to be con-
tacted for consent to participate before victims. This was 
done to avoid revictimization by encouraging victims to par-
ticipate in a process only to find the offender unwilling. Only 
after offenders agreed to participate were the victims to be 
approached. They too would receive an explanation of the 
program and would be invited to participate.
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The City Commission approved US$60,000 for the proj-
ect from a Federal Justice Assistance Grant (JAG). The 
US$60,000 was part of a larger grant received from the 
Recovery Act Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 
Grant Program (Office of Justice Programs, 2009).
FTAP benefitted enormously from the existence and 
expertise of the Dispute Resolution Center (DRC). The DRC 
had maintained a community victim–offender mediation 
program for 23 years prior to the start of the pilot program. 
This meant that RJCWM did not have to create a program, 
train mediators, or find money for start-up costs. This enabled 
FTAP’s design team to focus on expansion and integration 
within the judicial system rather than inception.
By the time of implementation, FTAP could best be 
described as the result of a unique collaboration between the 
City Attorney’s office at the local District Court, the City 
Commission, a nascent nonprofit organization (RJCWM), 
and an established restorative justice nonprofit mediation 
center. The City Attorney’s office functioned as a gatekeeper 
to the program; the District Court, somewhat reluctantly, 
allowed it as a diversion program. The City Commission pro-
vided the funding, the coalition provided the idea, and the 
mediation center provided the actual service delivery. The 
program, at the point of implementation, was dramatically 
different from the design RJCWM members had initially 
planned. However, it did present an opportunity for the deliv-
ery of restorative justice to the public, and an opportunity for 
restorative justice to prove that it could bring value to the 
administration of justice.
Implementation
The First 9 Months
The first 9 months spent establishing FTAP can be described 
as a period of education. Compared with the larger partisan 
State government, the City Commissioner’s position afforded 
opportunities to affect change with less buy-in from other 
officials. This was particularly true in the context of a city 
with a weak mayoral system where more power rests with 
the nonpartisan City Commission. Within the context of a 
seven-member commission, the City Commissioner needed 
only three additional votes to move the restorative practices 
forward.
At this early stage, several key parameters for a successful 
program were identified. First, the program would need to be 
conceptually integrated into the existing judicial framework 
and it would need to be rigorously evaluated. This would 
require access to both the City Attorney’s office and the 61st 
District Court. The benefits of implementing restorative prac-
tices would only be realized if the program was both philo-
sophically guided and empirically supported. Satisfying 
victims, holding offenders accountable, and engaging com-
munities may each contribute to a fairer system of justice, but 
will likely do little to persuade entrenched criminal justice 
personnel to adopt restorative practices (Hayes, 2007). 
Members of RJCWM felt the most effective way to persuade 
government officials would be to focus on the potential for 
positive economic benefits derived from the program. The 
emphasis on empirical evaluation was driven by a subcom-
mittee of RJCWM that became known as the academic group.
Early on in the formation of RJCWM, participation was 
elicited from local colleges and universities’ departments of 
criminal justice, sociology, social work, and communication 
studies. A core group of faculty from local universities 
coalesced to mindfully consider how best to develop a pro-
gram that could be evaluated with regard to the primary out-
comes of participant satisfaction, recidivism, and economic 
impact. These outcomes are commonly found in evaluations 
of restorative programs (Latimer, Dowden, & Muise, 2001).
The second key to success was that the program should be 
presented to the community in a way that would encourage 
the community to see value in the program. Proponents of 
the restorative alternative are familiar with the need defend 
restorative justice from the accusations that such programs 
are soft on crime (London, 2013). London describes this as 
one of the challenges to restorative justice theory and prac-
tice. He argues that proponents of restorative justice must 
reconcile “its advocacy of a nonpunitive response to crime 
with the public’s insistence on deterrence and retribution” 
(London, 2013, p. 7).
Finally, the program needed to be sustainable. This meant 
securing funding and establishing a service provision struc-
ture that would perpetuate the program in the absence of its 
initial leadership. In fact, this was the impetus for the entire 
coalition. From his experiences with other victims’ rights or 
community mediation programs, the Commissioner believed 
that any program would collapse without strong leadership. 
Keeping true to the restorative philosophy, the Commissioner 
set about cultivating interpersonal relationships guided by 
key restorative values such as respect, individual dignity, 
inclusion, responsibility, humility, mutual care, reparation, 
and nondomination (Pranis, 2007). He routinely met with 
members of various constituencies (i.e., neighborhood asso-
ciations, police, judges, academics, service providers). It was 
his hope that these individuals would help to sustain the pro-
gram after his departure.
In developing relatively high-quality relationships, the 
program’s leader charted a course guided by restorative val-
ues; yet, he remained concerned that his efforts to develop 
leader–member relationships would devolve after his depar-
ture. He hoped that a partnership with the DRC would be a 
stabilizing factor in the case of his absence. The involvement 
of the DRC meant that there was a service delivery system in 
place that was vested in sustaining these efforts.
The Second 9 Months: Clearing Obstacles
The second 9-month period was spent focusing on a few cru-
cial elements of the program, including funding stability and 
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empirical evaluation. Prudently, these were not separate con-
versations. Leadership, at this early stage, realized that 
although funding would hopefully be found to initiate a pilot 
program, any hope at sustaining that funding would need to 
be tied to empirical evidence of effectiveness.
In this period, seed funding was secured through a local 
denomination to pay a coordinator for 10 hr a week. She was 
compensated to schedule meetings, compose email lists, and 
organize communications. Programs dependent on volun-
teers to coordinate efforts have the potential to languish and 
slide into inaction. After the coordinator moved on, she was 
replaced by a local attorney working with the DRC who pro-
vided the consistency of communication and determination 
to pull together disparate elements and keep everything mov-
ing forward.
Meanwhile, RJCWM began to openly recruit new mem-
bers and elicit support for the cause of restorative justice. 
How this initiative would manifest was still unclear. 
According to RJCWM meeting minutes, it was about this 
time that meetings between coalition leaders, a retired judge, 
and the City Attorney and her staff began. Understanding 
what data were available from these stakeholders was a part 
of these discussions. With an eye toward the future, members 
of the academic group were already preparing for the evalu-
ation component.
Evaluation
Early on in stakeholder meetings, it was discovered that the 
city made almost no effort to obtain victim input data at all. 
Initially, it was thought that to demonstrate increases in vic-
tim satisfaction, baseline data would need to be collected 
prior to program implementation. Eventually, and at the urg-
ing of the academic subcommittee of RJCWM board, this 
idea was done away with in favor of a pilot program design 
that included both experimental and control groups.
Examples of surveys were solicited from local dispute 
resolution organizations, academics, and restorative justice-
based programs in nearby cities such as Muskegon, Michigan, 
which had a well-established victim–offender mediation pro-
gram. Over the following months, these surveys were revised 
to include quantitative measures on items such as fairness, 
restitution, relationships between participants, satisfaction, 
and accountability. In addition, qualitative measures were 
included to assess mediator behaviors that facilitated (or 
frustrated) mediation resolution, satisfaction, participant sin-
cerity, fairness, and motivation for participation. The research 
instruments were designed not only to demonstrate the suc-
cess of restorative alternatives in satisfying participants, 
increasing restitution, and reducing cost but also to begin to 
articulate clearer understandings of the how and why ques-
tions that plague restorative justice research. Although sig-
nificant positive results are observed in programs, what is 
less researched, and therefore less understood, is how and 
why restorative programs consistently produce those positive 
results (Bazemore & Elis, 2007; Hayes, 2007). This remains 
an area for further research, and the data currently being col-
lected will hopefully add to this body of scholarship.
Education
It was approximately 3 months into this second 9-month 
period that RJCWM contacted the local newspaper and an 
article about the proposed RJ pilot project appeared. 
Although this exposed a wider audience to the reality that 
such a program was being considered, reactions were mixed. 
In an effort to define the scope of the program, RJCWM 
described the program in several internal documents, and in 
the article, as a program of the 61st District Court. Reaction 
from judges within the Court was swift and critical, as the 
Court itself had little to do with the program’s inception and 
development. (See section titled “Discussion” for further 
consideration of this issue.)
In addition to some friction with the Court, public reac-
tion focused on common perceptions that such a program 
would be “soft on crime,” a criticism all too familiar to advo-
cates for restorative justice. From these reactions, it was 
clear that educating the community, something the group had 
consistently worked at, was going to be a never-ending proj-
ect. As a result of the reaction from numerous fronts, several 
changes were made to the pilot program. First, the program 
was no longer to be described as a 61st District Court pro-
gram. Second, the pilot program was strategically renamed 
the “Fast-Track Accountability Program” (FTAP). This was 
a linguistic shift, designed to communicate the simplest and 
most politically viable benefits of the pilot. Use of the term 
accountability (a staple of restorative justice) was chosen 
quite intentionally because of the more punitive connotation. 
This, it was believed, might appease some concern, and also 
demonstrated that the need for education about restorative 
justice continued to be necessary.
Funding
Nearing the end of the second 9 months, two significant 
events unfolded. First, an effort was made to acquire a Social 
Venture Investors grant through a local community founda-
tion. The program made it to the final round of consideration, 
but ultimately did not receive funding. The potential funders 
identified the relatively limited scope of the program as a 
major concern. At the same time, however, RJCWM was 
making steps to solidify itself as an organization, adopting a 
constitution, bylaws, and establishing a formal board of 
directors. The Board’s election marks the turning point from 
an informal grassroots gathering to a codified, hierarchical 
organization with elected leadership, committees, and more 
clearly formalized and articulated responsibilities.
In the final 3-month push toward implementation, the 
newly minted FTAP relied heavily on the clout of its Board 
(including City Commissioners, a retired judge, dispute 
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resolution professionals, academics, and several well-known 
local community members). The relationships built over the 
preceding 18 months proved invaluable in coordinating the 
pilot development and implementation. FTAP’s first media-
tion was conducted just short of 2 years after the City 
Commissioner took office.
Program Implementation: Continuing 
Challenges
The actual implementation of FTAP moved rather slowly, 
both in terms of receiving the first program participant and 
in the number of participants who successfully completed 
the process. After little more than a year into the program, 
a total of 70 cases had been routed into FTAP. Of these, 25 
cases cleared the double consent needed to begin the pro-
cess, and 15 have successfully completed mediations and 
contracts. Several aspects of the implementation process 
have contributed to the slow start: the complexities and 
inflexibilities of the current criminal justice system, and the 
program design itself.
One of the first major issues with implementation 
emerged at the point of arraignment. At arraignment, the 
accused pleads either guilty or not guilty. From a restor-
ative justice perspective, FTAP was particularly interested 
in those who acknowledged they were at fault and pled 
guilty. However, these were precisely the people to whom 
the current system denied access. Individuals who pled 
guilty at arraignment were routed through a summary sys-
tem that quickly adjudicated and dismissed them. From the 
Court’s perspective, these were ideal cases, as they repre-
sented financial income with minimal associated court 
costs. Board members of RJCWM and others continue to 
examine ways to reimagine this process. Instead, FTAP 
was left with those who pled not guilty at arraignment. 
Some of these individuals likely believe themselves to be 
innocent and others are simply unwilling to accept respon-
sibility for their actions. Either way, they are not interested 
in meeting with a victim to discuss a crime for which they 
do not feel responsible. In essence, the adversarial struc-
ture of the existing system reinforced nonparticipation by 
offenders.
Unfortunately, the criminal justice system encourages 
individuals interested in obtaining the best possible outcome, 
even if they may privately acknowledge guilt, to plead not 
guilty. Many defense attorneys will counsel their clients to 
plead not guilty, initially, to plea bargain for a better deal. 
Admission of guilt is a bargaining chip to be played at the 
appropriate time in the process.
This status quo continues to be particularly problematic in 
the context of restorative justice wherein offenders are 
encouraged to accept responsibility for their actions before 
participation. In fact, typically, an acceptance of responsibil-
ity is required before a case will enter victim–offender medi-
ation, lest an offender shows up and denies participation or 
responsibility for his actions, causing the other party (the 
victim) to feel revictimized.
There did remain one incentive for participation by eligi-
ble offenders. By participating, offenders found that they 
could successfully complete the program and in doing so, 
keep the charges from appearing on their record. However, 
participation in restorative justice is less than ideal when 
coerced or forced. It continues to be essential for the practi-
tioners to screen cases appropriately to determine whether 
and when an offender is participating for the wrong reason.
In addition to not being able to access individuals who 
pled guilty, FTAP was also unable to help individuals avoid 
the mechanisms of the traditional process entirely, thereby 
taking on the functional approach of an add-on to the exist-
ing system, as opposed to an alternative to the existing sys-
tem. The judges of the 61st District Court are held responsible 
for their caseloads by the Supreme Court of Michigan. After 
a case enters the 61st District Court’s computer system, the 
Court has a fixed timeline to process it before an automated 
notice is sent to the Supreme Court. As a result, the judges 
were unwilling to exempt FTAP participants from custom-
ary court appearances such as the pretrial and settlement 
conferences. For example, if John Doe went through FTAP, 
and spent 60 days working on his contract only to renege, 
the court would be left with precious little time to process 
the case when it flushed back into the traditional system 
before being censured by the Supreme Court. Consequently, 
individuals enrolled in FTAP have been required to concur-
rently attend all the same court proceedings as someone 
involved in the traditional system. This had the unfortunate 
consequence of negating all the possible cost-savings asso-
ciated with avoiding time in a courtroom in front of a judge, 
and instead cost more money per case. From the Court’s per-
spective, the only way around this would be to move 
entrance into the program precharge, an approach that 
RJCWM is actively advocating.
Even when cases were assigned to FTAP, establishing 
contact with offenders and victims to offer participation 
proved difficult. The DRC was frequently unable to make 
any contact whatsoever, and only occasionally been able to 
satisfy the double consent needed to even begin the process. 
Attrition as a result of individuals who do not answer their 
phones, have lost phone service, have moved, or are other-
wise unavailable presented a serious obstacle to FTAP. 
Sometimes the police records that the DRC relied on to make 
contacts were inaccurate, due to clerical errors or false infor-
mation provided. In addition, it was quite possible that some 
individuals do not return calls because they are, or believed 
they were, innocent. It was hoped that if/as the program con-
tinues, community awareness of the program will make suc-
cessful contact more likely. As these issues were being 
discovered, other aspects of the project struggled to prepare 
for service delivery.
The evaluation of the program faced numerous challenges. 
FTAP’s founders had been very explicit in their desire to 
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incorporate a rigorous evaluation into the design and imple-
mentation of the program. To accomplish this, US$10,000 
of the US$60,000 total funding from the city for the project 
was allocated for research. On August 11, 2009, the City 
Commission approved the research funding. The research 
monies were to be contracted to the Center for Social Research 
(CSR) at one of the local colleges. The CSR was to help over-
see the research design and data collection in cooperation 
with the academic committee of RJCWM.
The academic calendar, however, moves differently 
than that of the City or of politicians interested in results. 
The program ultimately began before approval to study it 
had been obtained, with the first participants entering in 
July 2009. In effect, the program started not only before 
the research design had been fully delineated but before 
the program itself had been completely conceptualized. At 
the center of the entire project was the City Commissioner, 
with existing relationships to all the spokes of the wheel, 
but the spokes had little connection to each other except 
the center. With pressure radiating from the center, the 
many spokes moved awkwardly out of sync. The research 
design, and a fully coherent concept of the program itself, 
lagged behind service delivery, something that continues 
to cause problems.
Despite having Human Subject Institutional Review 
Board (HSIRB) approval, data collection only began to catch 
up with service delivery in December 2009. To address some 
of the issues that come from attempting to assemble a data 
set from multiple sources, CSR decided to house all the data 
in an online QuickBase database. This has enabled the vari-
ous agencies to input data relevant to their role in the process 
into one common, real time receptacle.
Even after finalizing the research design, attempts to 
make changes to FTAP have continued. One that has emerged 
is a result of difficulties with certain victims. At this point in 
the program, 75% of the offenders have been individuals 
charged with removing property not their own (shoplifting). 
Many victims of shoplifting are small retail chains. They 
often have neither the desire nor legal ability to engage in 
mediation with shoplifters. Although this is typical, the 
response from larger retail chains has been different. In gen-
eral, the large retail chains have been highly supportive of 
FTAP, some have even started referring their own cases to 
the program and asking for the court’s willingness to dismiss 
the charges. As previously mentioned, certain restorative jus-
tice programs have addressed similar situations through the 
use of victim impact panels or accountability boards. 
RJCWM forwarded the possibility of such options to the 
City Attorney’s office, but the current low volume of cases 
makes such a move unnecessary.
Given the whittling away of the sample from which data 
can be drawn, a fully random experimental design is increas-
ingly untenable. Although this was one of the Commissioner’s 
highest hopes for the program, it has proven almost impossi-
ble to implement. Data gleaned from the small sample would 
struggle to be statistically significant, and even statistical sig-
nificance would be tarnished from an academic standpoint by 
some of the structural problems with the program itself, par-
ticularly the exclusion of individuals who plead guilty. At this 
point, there is not sufficient political capital to make the fun-
damental changes to the program that would allow it to func-
tion as it was originally conceptualized.
One of the primary sticking points for the City Attorney’s 
office remains the “Willie Horton” concern. In 1987, Horton 
was serving a life sentence without parole for murder, when 
he was released on a weekend furlough program only to 
commit assault and rape. The City Attorney’s office does not 
want to be responsible for an individual who is admitted into 
the FTAP program, and while in diversion offends against 
either their original victim or someone else. Yet, this is the 
self-preservation of individuals and offices tethered to the 
adversarial system of justice whereby politics serves to dele-
gitimize alternative justice approaches. The benefit of having 
offenders simultaneously involved in the traditional system 
is that a no-contact order between the alleged offender and 
victim is automatically issued, and while hardly capable of 
preventing something from occurring, the order at least 
extends legal protection. Moving the program precharge 
would mean losing that no-contact order, and accepting the 
potential political fallout with the community should some-
thing occur. Members of RJCWM have forwarded the pos-
sibility of offering victims the opportunity to file personal 
protection orders (PPOs) as an alternative.
Ideally, the community would be equally invested in 
restorative practices, and agree to accept the possibility of 
potential isolated incidents in favor of the greater good. For 
it to succeed, the community must realize they have a stake 
in restorative justice, that the justice process belongs to the 
community (Zehr & Mika, 1998).
Discussion
Several lessons have been learned along that way are easily 
transferable to other locations and efforts to implement 
restorative justice. First, program designers and implement-
ers should recognize that the government must be both will-
ing and capable of shifting focus from punishing, to 
promoting accountability in the effort to repair harms. This 
shift represents a major philosophical change, one that 
requires another significant practical change. It requires an 
alternative forum for the administration of justice. Members 
of RJCWM took on the role of change agents (Rogers, 1995) 
and toiled in the challenge to encourage the philosophical 
and practical shift necessary to implement the restorative 
practices. Although this may seem like common sense, it is 
really about the actual assessment of the states’ willingness 
to make these changes that is so important. Program design-
ers and implementers would also do well to be aware that 
these changes are particularly difficult within a rights-based 
and adversarial system (Schiff, 2007). The authors would 
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recommend a thorough review of the diffusion of innovation 
literature prior to even designing an innovative program.
Restorative justice asks stakeholders to look at crime 
through a fundamentally different lens, one with which most 
police officers, judges, and lawyers may have only cursory 
familiarity, at best. These justice professionals are asked to 
shift their role from that of expertise problem solver to that of 
community facilitator. This shift requires not only the rei-
magining of roles (and the norms for behavior associated 
with those roles) but also the reordering of priorities and 
restructuring of power (Gerkin, 2008; Schiff, 2007). 
Furthermore, within a restorative framework, justice profes-
sionals are called not only to support these changes, but also 
to lead the paradigm shift as supporters and advocates.
Second, those designing and implementing restorative 
programs should take great care in publicizing and promot-
ing their programs. Without being taught why and how 
restorative justice benefits the community and holds offend-
ers accountable, program planners are likely to experience 
various levels of resistance. Program developers would do 
well to remember that communities likely have no collective 
memory of a time when they did handle their own problems. 
Community participation in justice has atrophied as the 
adversarial system has matured and become more complex. 
Communities are unfamiliar with restorative justice and are 
likely neither ready nor willing to participate. They will 
likely be uncomfortable at even the thought of being asked to 
do so. Others are likely to perceive restorative justice as soft 
on crime and consequently of little value. Education is 
important. That includes the education of the state, as well as 
the public.
Third, funding and evaluation should be a top priority. 
These issues are intertwined and any long term hope for the 
program will likely be tied to one or both of these. The pro-
gram needs to demonstrate a value. Although saving money 
is always a benefit and one that is likely to generate contin-
ued support, programs that hold offenders accountable, 
restore victims, and reintegrate offenders will bring the 
greatest benefits to the participants and the community.
Finally, program designers and implementers should 
count as one of their own, a major player currently working 
within the retributive criminal justice system. Although not 
absolutely necessary, implementing a program from the out-
side is difficult.
Programs implemented within governmental structures 
frequently face challenges involving postcharge, postpolice 
players such as prosecutors. Furthermore, they frequently 
struggle to foster both community support and support from 
victim service providers (Clairmont, 2005).
Conclusion
Flexibility with participants’ changing roles continues to be 
both a strength and a challenge for RJCWM. In looking at 
the notes from initial meetings, the shift in participants is of 
note. In the early planning stage, participants included 
older, more established researchers and academics. The 
academics most intimately involved at the point of imple-
mentation were all comparatively new to RJCWM, unten-
ured, and young. As with any other grassroots effort, 
decisions are made, projects are completed, and progress is 
realized not by the most highly qualified or positioned, but 
by those that are present.
Members of RJCWM discovered abundant truth in the 
words of 61st Court Administrator Josef Soper who 
remarked that programs such as restorative justice are 
implemented because people who are in a position to imple-
ment them, do (Soper, 2006). In the end, there was no one 
on the board of directors for RJCWM, no one of note among 
the design team who was realistically in a position to imple-
ment the program that was designed. Negotiating the actual 
details of the program to be delivered were not really nego-
tiations. In several instances, RJCWM pushed back against 
decisions made by those working in the system. Ultimately 
RJCWM had little power or authority to impose their will. 
It would certainly be fair to say that there was some naivety 
among RJCWM about how difficult this task would be. As 
advocates of restorative justice, members of the coalition 
saw the value in implementing restorative practices. 
However, convincing those on the inside of the system was 
far more challenging than expected.
Reflecting on the program that was eventually imple-
mented, one board member noted, “At the point of imple-
mentation, several of us realized that what was being 
implemented was so far removed from what we envisioned 
and what we designed that we were questioning why we 
were even doing it” (P. Gerkin, personal communication, 
November 13, 2013). This experience is shared by others 
who have tried to implement restorative justice (Lemley & 
Russell, 2002).
Ironically, the City Attorney’s office was taking note of 
the paradigm shift that was taking place. The City Attorney’s 
office made some restorative changes before FTAP had even 
been fully conceptualized. Up until they were approached, 
the City Attorney’s office had virtually no communication 
with victims of misdemeanors. The victim-centric vision of 
FTAP prompted the City Attorney to begin sending out a let-
ter to all victims of misdemeanors expressing regret and 
offering opportunities for involvement in the traditional sys-
tem. Furthermore, the City Attorney became interested in the 
experiences of victims within the traditional system. She 
began collecting survey data from victims about their satis-
faction with the City Attorney’s Office and the processing of 
their case. This co-opting of restorative principles for incor-
poration into the formal criminal justice system is not new 
(Johnstone, 2011).
In Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, restorative practices 
were inserted directly into the formal criminal justice system 
(Van Ness & Strong, 2002). Police officers, using their dis-
cretion, began facilitating conferences with juveniles, adding 
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to the options of cautioning juveniles or referring them to the 
juvenile court (Van Ness & Strong, 2002). The officers them-
selves became the mediators. Others have suggested that tri-
als could become more restorative by holding jury 
deliberations in front of the victim and defendant or by 
allowing jury members to ask questions during the trial (Van 
Ness & Strong, 2002).
It remains to be seen how the program and RJCWM will 
balance the need of a pilot program to be flexible to craft a 
quality program while maintaining the academic rigor nec-
essary to demonstrate the program’s benefit. It is clear that 
some very positive steps have been taken in to increase 
the restorative character of justice in the community. 
Community stakeholders and politicians came together to 
begin the difficult task of tackling a complex system, and 
obtained the necessary political and financial capital to 
implement an experimental program that has had real ben-
efits for those involved. At the same time, it is clear that 
better communication between the City Attorney’s office 
and the 61st District Court and DRC is needed to move the 
program toward financial sustainability, and that a solution 
for the problem of how to replace a no-contact order must 
be found if this program is to succeed precharge. Moving 
forward, RJCWM must find ways to address these issues to 
maintain the support of the City Commission. The coalition 
must also be careful to maintain the support and service 
provision of the DRC, and assist it in expanding its capaci-
ties, but substantial progress has been made. The City 
Commissioner has said that broken systems do not repair 
themselves overnight.
As a postscript, the authors would like to acknowledge 
that the political environment, processes, issues, and impli-
cations discussed herein are unique and not necessarily rep-
licable across contexts. Despite this declaration, this account 
is offered to encourage others in their efforts to move restor-
ative justice from vision to reality. Identifying the problems 
and pitfalls delegitimizing restorative processes is in itself 
important for egalitarian community building and restoring 
justice.
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Notes
1. Michigan Penal Code 9.133(5) Removing Property Not Own.
2. Michigan Penal Code 9.133(4) Malicious Destruction of 
Property.
3. Michigan Penal Code 9.133(7) Meddle and Tamper With 
Property.
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